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Autonomy, Adaptation, and Rationality—A Critical Discussion of Jon Elster’s Concept of "Sour Grapes," Part II

STEP (Group for Studies in Technology, Innovation and Economic Policy), Oslo

This paper argues against Jon Elster’s contention that there is a fundamental incompatibility between, on one hand, autonomy and rationality and, on the other hand, adaptation to conditions of one’s existence in the sense that one’s desires or preferences are adjusted to what it is possible to achieve. While the first part of the paper more narrowly concentrated on Elster’s discussion of these ideas, this second part goes on to a more general discussion of the concept of rationality. On the basis of this discussion, it is claimed that Elster’s conclusions concerning autonomy and adaptation are premised on a defective conception of human experience and rationality. Moreover, the claim is made that these defects are also characteristic of "rational choice theory" more generally.

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 29, No. 2, 173-205 (1999)
DOI: 10.1177/004839319902900201


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