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RacismAgainst Jorge Garcia's Moral and Psychological MonismUniversité du Québec à Montréal
University of Pittsburgh In this article, we argue that it can be fruitful for philosophers interested in the nature and moral significance of racism to pay more attention to psychology. We do this by showing that psychology provides new arguments against Garcia's views about the nature and moral significance of racism. We contend that some scientific studies of racial cognition undermine Garcia's moral and psychological monism about racism: Garcia disregards (1) the rich affective texture of racism and (2) the diversity of what makes racial ills morally wrong.
Key Words: racism emotions implicit bias psychology racial ills pluralism
This version was published on March
1, 2009 Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 39, No. 1,
41-62 (2009) This article has been cited by other articles:
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