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Testimony from a Popperian Perspective

University of Birmingham

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: A.R.Diller{at}cs.bham.ac.uk.

	Abstract

Currently, testimony is studied extensively in Anglo-American philosophy. However, most of this work is done from a justificationist perspective in which philosophers try to justify our reliance on testimony in some way. I agree with Popper that justificationism is radically mistaken. Thus, I construct an account of how we respond to testimony that in no way attempts to justify our reliance on it. This account is not a straightforward exegesis of Popper, as he never tackled testimony systematically. It makes use, however, of several of Popper’s key insights and incorporates them into a viable theory of testimony.

First published on August 26, 2008, doi:10.1177/0048393108324083

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 2008;38:419.

A more recent version of this article appeared on December 1, 2008


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