This Article Full Text (OnlineFirst PDF) All Versions of this Article: 0048393108328150v1 39/1/20    most recent Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Reiss, J. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Causation in the Social Sciences: Evidence, Inference, and Purpose

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: reiss{at}fwb.eur.nl.

	Abstract

All univocal analyses of causation face counterexamples. An attractive response to this situation is to become a pluralist about causal relationships. "Causal pluralism" is itself, however, a pluralistic notion. In this article, I argue in favor of pluralism about concepts of cause in the social sciences. The article will show that evidence for, inference from, and the purpose of causal claims are very closely linked.

First published on January 15, 2009, doi:10.1177/0048393108328150

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 2009;39:20.

A more recent version of this article appeared on March 1, 2009


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?