Philosophy of the Social Sciences recent issues

Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints

Maki, U. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

The paper seeks to offer [1] an explication of a concept of economics imperialism, focusing on its epistemic aspects; and [2] criteria for its normative assessment. In regard to [1], the defining notion is that of explanatory unification across disciplinary boundaries. As to [2], three kinds of constraints are proposed. An ontological constraint requires an increased degree of ontological unification in contrast to mere derivational unification. An axiological constraint derives from variation in the perceived relative significance of the facts explained. An epistemological constraint requires strong fallibilism acknowledging a particularly severe epistemic uncertainty and proscribing against over-confident arrogance.

Habermas and the Political Sciences: The Relationship between Theory and Practice1

Pedersen, J. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

Jürgen Habermas’s theories have received enormous attention in the public sphere as well as in political science. It is therefore surprising that his method, rational reconstruction, is not more debated. In political science the method is of particular interest because of its ambition to bridge the gap between empirical and normative approaches. In this article the author traces Habermas’s interest in rational reconstruction by going back to his writings on theory and practice and subsequently shows what the method’s main principles are. He then specifies how this methodological conception is used in Habermas’s political theory. Finally, the introduction of an empirical design allows the author to discuss one of the fundamental tensions in Habermas’s approach: the hypotheses arrived at through rational reconstruction are empirical hypotheses but cannot be tested by empirical means.

Why Organizational Ecology Is Not a Darwinian Research Program

Reydon, T. A. C., Scholz, M. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

Organizational ecology is commonly seen as a Darwinian research program that seeks to explain the diversity of organizational structures, properties and behaviors as the product of selection in past social environments in a similar manner as evolutionary biology seeks to explain the forms, properties and behaviors of organisms as consequences of selection in past natural environments. We argue that this explanatory strategy does not succeed because organizational ecology theory lacks an evolutionary mechanism that could be identified as the principal cause of organizational diversity. The "evolution" of organizational populations by means of selection, which organizational ecologists put forward as the mechanism responsible for the extant diversity of organizational forms, is not evolution in any proper sense, because organizational populations do not have what it takes to participate in evolutionary processes. This implies that organizational ecology is not a Darwinian research program and that it cannot explain organizational diversity.

The Realist Approach to Explanatory Mechanisms in Social Science: More than a Heuristic?

Demetriou, C. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

The mechanism-realist paradigm in the philosophy of science, championed by Mario Bunge and Roy Bhaskar, sets certain expectations for the substantive social-scientific application of the paradigm. To evaluate the application of the paradigm in accomplished substantive research, as well as the potential for future research, I examine the work of Charles Tilly, the exemplary substantive work in the mechanism-realist tradition. Based on this examination, I argue for the usefulness of explanatory mechanisms, provided that they are couched in terms of a heuristic. Such a position is the most reasonable one to adopt given the expectations set by the paradigm in relation to complexity stemming from mechanism interaction and to a notion of causality that is deeper than that acknowledged by empiricism and positivism.

In Defense of Organizational Evolution: A Reply to Reydon and Scholz

Lemos, J. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

Organizational ecology applies Darwinian principles of natural selection to understand the evolution of new forms of organizations over time. The idea here is that there are different forms of human organizations, such as different business organizations, religious organizations, political organizations, etc. The growth of new forms of organizations within each of these fields is to be understood in terms of a struggle for existence among organizations with different traits. In a recent article, Reydon and Scholz (2009) argue that this Darwinian view of the evolution of new organizational forms is highly problematic because organizational populations do not exhibit the levels of internal cohesion, isolation, and closure that are necessary for something like Darwinian evolution to occur. In this article, I defend organizational ecology by rebutting the arguments of Reydon and Scholz.

Racism: In Defense of Garcia

Valls, A. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

Luc Faucher and Edouard Machery’s recent article in this journal uses evidence from psychological studies to criticize Jorge Garcia’s view of racism. This brief response argues that their critique fails because they misinterpret Garcia’s view and engage in some conceptual equivocation. It also argues that their focus on affect and human psychology is in fact compatible with Garcia’s view of racism as rooted in the human heart. Hence the evidence that they cite should be seen as empirical enrichment of Garcia’s basic view, rather than as evidence against that view.

Shrinking Merton

Turner, S. P. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

Agassi, Sztompka, Kincaid, and Crothers argue, in various ways, that Merton should not be held responsible for his published views on theory construction, and they provide psychological or strategic explanations for his failure to resolve issues with these views. I argue that this line of defense is unnecessary. A better case for Merton would be that theories in his middle-range sense were a nontechnical alternative solution to the problem of spurious correlation. Middle-range theory was not, however, a solution to the problem of diverse approaches. Merton also did not resolve the problems with his account of functionalism, and the problems undermine the claim that he had a distinctive "structural" approach all along.

No Dilemma for Pancritical Rationalism: In Response to Hauptli

Rowbottom, D. P. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

Hauptli (1991) presents a putative dilemma for Bartley’s (1984) pancritical rationalism that has remained unchallenged. This note sets the record straight by exposing two lacunae in Hauptli’s argument.

Review Essays: Whewell's Philosophy under Dispute

Curtis, R. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

William Whewell tried to explain how scientific knowledge of necessary and certain truth was possible by tracing it to ideas that arose not out of experience but had an independent origin in the mind. Although Whewell has generally been regarded as an a priorist in some sense and as a proponent of hypothetico-deductivism, Snyder tries to show that he can be assimilated to the twentieth-century inductivist mainstream. She fails to make her case, however, in part because she fails to pay sufficient attention to Whewell’s insistence that scientific discovery is beyond the reach of method and always involves happy guesses.

The Advantage of Theft over Honest Toil

Agassi, J. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

Gregory Landini offers a new and an illuminating reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea about his own innovation: it is the invention of a notation that removes the mystery from all theorems of logic and of mathematics as it renders their proofs part of their wordings. This makes all theorems in principle as boring as "all four-legged animals are animals." This idea is Wittgenstein’s doctrine of showing. It is worthless; yet, as Landini shows, every time Wittgenstein offered an elaboration on it, Russell checked it carefully and found it of no value. This, let me add, shows that Russell was in error in suggesting that intellectually there is no "advantage of theft over honest toil": at times one may pay back and with high interest. Other cases may be due to misjudgment rather than to sloth.

Book Review: Sawyer, R. Keith. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Ylikoski, P. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

Book Review: Tuomela, Raimo. (2007). The Philosophy of Sociality. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

Wettersten, J. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

Book Review: McFalls, Laurence (ed.). (2007). Max Weber's "Objectivity" Reconsidered. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press

Bruun, H. H. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

Book Review: Ringer, F. (2004). Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Kedar, A. — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:03:14 PDT

Obama's Political Philosophy: Pragmatism, Politics, and the University of Chicago

Schultz, B. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

In early work, I argued that Barack Obama, the 44th president of the United States, often represented, in his political speeches and writings, a form of philosophical pragmatism with special relations to the University of Chicago and its reform tradition. That form of pragmatism, especially evident in the work of such early figures as John Dewey and Jane Addams, and such later figures as Saul Alinsky, Abner Mikva, David Greenstone, Richard Rorty, Danielle Allen, and Cass Sunstein, contributed greatly to the intellectual atmosphere that Obama breathed during his many years in Chicago as a community organizer, senior lecturer in the University of Chicago Law School, and emerging figure in Illinois politics. And that form of pragmatism has, from Dewey to Obama, been keenly concerned to appropriate for its purposes the legacy of Abraham Lincoln. My purpose in this essay is to set out these filiations in ways more accessible to a global audience, and to carry the story forward through the opening moves of the Obama presidency.

Many Approaches, but Few Arrivals: Merton and the Columbia Model of Theory Construction

Turner, S. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

Robert Merton's essays on theories of the middle range and his essays on functional explanation and the structural approach are among the most influential in the history of sociology. But their import is a puzzle. He explicitly allied himself with some of the most extreme scientistic formalists and contributed to and endorsed the Columbia model of theory construction. But Merton never responded to criticisms by Ernest Nagel of his arguments or acknowledged the rivalry between Lazarsfeld and Herbert Simon, rarely cited the philosophical and methodological literature, and responded to critics with ambiguous concessions, leaving the Mertonian legacy profoundly ambiguous.

Ian Hacking's Proposal for the Distinction between Natural and Social Sciences

Martinez, M. L. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

This article explores the proposal offered by Ian Hacking for the distinction between natural and social sciences—a proposal that he has defined from the outset as complex and different from the traditional ones. Our objective is not only to present the path followed by Hacking's distinction, but also to determine if it constitutes a novelty or not. For this purpose, we deemed it necessary to briefly introduce the core notions Hacking uses to establish his strategic approach to social sciences, under the assumption that they are less well known that the ones corresponding to his treatment of natural sciences.

We and the Plural Subject

de Bruin, B. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

Margaret Gilbert's plural subject theory defines social collectives in terms of common knowledge of expressed willingness to participate in some joint action. The author critically examines Gilbert's application of this theory to linguistic phenomena involving "we," arguing that recent work in linguistics provides the tools to develop a superior account. The author indicates that, apart from its own relevance, one should care about this critique because Gilbert's claims about the first person plural pronoun play a role in the argument in favor of her recent theory of political obligation.

The Assault Badly Misses the Mark: (Comment on Stephen Turner)

Sztompka, P. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

The critique of Robert K. Merton in terms of the criteria relevant for the history of methodology is misdirected. Merton has never been a methodologist, and his influential notion of middle-range theories has been merely a polemical position taken both against pure abstract, conceptual constructs, and narrow fact-finding. It helped sociology to sustain fruitful directions of research, free from abuses of "grand theory" as well as pure empiricism. Merton's true and many "arrivals" (read: contributions to sociology) have been substantive and not meta-theoretical. Because of them he is a classic of twentieth-century sociology.

A More Sophisticated Merton

Kincaid, H. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

An alternative account of Merton to that provided by Turner is sketched. It shows strong similarities to some quite plausible contemporary understandings of science in general. Given this reading, it would seem that Merton did not drastically change his position nor does it suffer from the ambiguities that Turner describes.

Merton's Flawed and Incomplete Methodological Program: Response to Stephen Turner

Crothers, C. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

Particularly during the 1940s, Robert Merton developed a loosely knit methodological program including such key concepts as "structure and functional analysis" and "middle range theories" which provided guidance for sociological work over several decades and which retains some considerable relevance today. However, there are inconsistencies and incompletions in this program which have become more problematic over time. The paper questions the depth of these difficulties and also points out that in the historical circumstances of a limited stimulus provided by the paucity of critique written at the time and Robert Merton's operational style, it is not surprising that difficulties were not attended to.

Turner on Merton

Agassi, J. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

Stephen Turner complains about weaknesses of Robert K. Merton's teachings without noticing that these are common. He puts down Merton's ideas despite his innovations, on the ground that they are not successful and not sufficiently revolutionary. The criteria by which he condemns Merton are too vague and too high. Merton's merit is in his having put the sociology of science on the map and drawn attention to the egalitarianism that was prominent in classical science and that is now diminished.

Review Essay: Pyrrhic Victories and a Trojan Horse in the Strauss Wars

Altman, W. H. F. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

A careful reading of Harvey C. Mansfield's Manliness (2006) and the recent translation (2007) of Daniel Tanguay's Leo Strauss; une biographie intellectuelle (2003) reveals that neither text supports the view that Leo Strauss was a harmless if qualified friend of liberal democracy.

Book Review: Keuth, H. (2005). The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Andersson, G. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

Book Review: Elster, Jon. (2007). Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Kuchle, G., Rios, D. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

Book Review: Wettersten, J. (2005). Whewell's Critics: Have They Prevented Him from Doing Good? Amsterdam and New York: Radopi

Bar-Am, N. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

Book Review: Deeb, L. (2006). An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi'i Lebanon. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Gray, K. W. — Tue, 05 May 2009 12:30:23 PDT

Constructing "The Economy"

Schabas, M. — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 11:03:53 PST

Economists study "The Economy," or so one might suppose. Yet this overarching entity is strikingly absent from mainstream theory. Since the 1950s, it has generally been described with a few mathematical propositions and not given a description that attends to institutions, power relations, or the emergent properties that form the leading indicators in macroeconomic theory. There is thus a significant divergence between folk economics and scientific economics on this theoretical entity. This article briefly addresses the history of this concept, noting its heyday in the interwar years, and brings to bear some of the analytical apparatus on institutional facts devised by John Searle. Whatever is meant by "The Economy" in folk economics appears to be significantly divergent from what is posited in scientific economics.

Causation in the Social Sciences: Evidence, Inference, and Purpose

Reiss, J. — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 11:03:53 PST

All univocal analyses of causation face counterexamples. An attractive response to this situation is to become a pluralist about causal relationships. "Causal pluralism" is itself, however, a pluralistic notion. In this article, I argue in favor of pluralism about concepts of cause in the social sciences. The article will show that evidence for, inference from, and the purpose of causal claims are very closely linked.

Racism: Against Jorge Garcia's Moral and Psychological Monism

Faucher, L., Machery, E. — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 11:03:53 PST

In this article, we argue that it can be fruitful for philosophers interested in the nature and moral significance of racism to pay more attention to psychology. We do this by showing that psychology provides new arguments against Garcia's views about the nature and moral significance of racism. We contend that some scientific studies of racial cognition undermine Garcia's moral and psychological monism about racism: Garcia disregards (1) the rich affective texture of racism and (2) the diversity of what makes racial ills morally wrong.

Troubles with Stereotypes for Spinozan minds

Huebner, B. — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 11:03:54 PST

Some people succeed in adopting feminist ideals in spite of the prevalence of asymmetric power relations. However, those who adopt such ideals face a number of psychological difficulties in inhibiting stereotype-based judgments. I argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers a more complete understanding of the mechanisms that underwrite our intuitive stereotype-based judgments. I also argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers resources for avoiding stereotype-based judgments where they are antecedently recognized to be pernicious and insidious.

Self-Ownership and the Lockean Proviso

Machan, T. R. — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 11:03:54 PST

Locke's defense of private property rights includes what is called a proviso— "the Lockean proviso"—and some have argued that in terms of it the right to private property can have various exceptions and it may not even be unjust to redistribute wealth that is privately owned. I argue that this cannot be right because it would imply that one's right to life could also have various exceptions, so anyone's life (and labor) could be subject to conscription if some would need it badly enough. Since this could amount to enslavement and involuntary servitude, it would be morally and legally unacceptable.

Review Essay: Sociology as a Political Project: Fuller's Argument against Bioliberalism

Yoshida, K. — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 11:03:54 PST

In his book, The New Sociological Imagination, Steve Fuller criticizes what he calls "bioliberalism." According to him, the social sciences are challenged on two sides: humanistic and biological. In particular, Fuller finds the biological challenge serious. Fuller tries to reinvent sociology as a socialist project to counterattack bioliberalism as the biggest threat to the social sciences. First, the author will examine Fuller's argument against bioliberalism, referring to the so-called "liberal eugenics." Then the author will criticize him. By reinventing sociology as a socialist project, Fuller seems to ignore the relation between value-freedom and education. One of the reasons Max Weber argued for value-freedom was to prevent sociology teachers from imposing their particular views on their students. We must consider this problem of teaching undergraduates sociology and other subjects in a better way if we are to have better social institutions.

Review Essay: John Rawls's Last Word

Schultz, B. — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 11:03:54 PST

Although no one can deny the profound importance of John Rawls's work in political philosophy, which covered both an original theory of justice and extensive work and teaching on the history of moral and political philosophy, we are now at the point where his contributions more clearly suggest certain historical limitations. Such topics as gender justice, racial justice, and environmental justice figured in Rawls's work only belatedly and in less than satisfactory ways. Surely the wide influence of the Rawlsian revolution should suggest that the erasures and blindspots in his historical reconstructions ought to be acknowledged and addressed, rather than avoided out of some misguided conception of charity in interpretation.

Book Review: Catton, P., & Macdonald, G. (Eds.). (2004). Karl Popper: Critical appraisals. London: Routledge. Pp. xii + 235

Andersson, G. — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 11:03:54 PST

Book Review: Badiou, A. (2007). The Century. Oxford, UK: Polity Press

Koch, A. M. — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 11:03:54 PST

Book Review: Harmon, J. E., and Gross, A. G. (Eds.). (2007). The Scientific Literature: A Guided Tour. Chicago: the Chicago University Press

Agassi, J. — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 11:03:54 PST

Testimony from a Popperian Perspective

Diller, A. — Thu, 30 Oct 2008 14:07:54 PDT

Currently, testimony is studied extensively in Anglo-American philosophy. However, most of this work is done from a justificationist perspective in which philosophers try to justify our reliance on testimony in some way. I agree with Popper that justificationism is radically mistaken. Thus, I construct an account of how we respond to testimony that in no way attempts to justify our reliance on it. This account is not a straightforward exegesis of Popper, as he never tackled testimony systematically. It makes use, however, of several of Popper's key insights and incorporates them into a viable theory of testimony.

Habermas' Method: Rational Reconstruction

Pedersen, J. — Thu, 30 Oct 2008 14:07:54 PDT

Given the prominent position Habermas' philosophy has gained, it is surprising that his method, rational reconstruction, has not caused more debate. This article clarifies what this method consists of, and shows how it is used in two of Habermas' research programs. The method is an interesting, but problematic way of confronting some of the basic epistemological questions in the social sciences. It represents an alternative to both the empirical-analytical and the hermeneutic tradition. On the basis of this methodology, Habermas' work is situated between the transcendental and the empirical approach. A fundamental problem is that it remains unclear how to test the hypothesis put forward through rational reconstruction.

No Letters: Hobbes and 20th-Century Philosophy of Language

Grundy, W.P. — Thu, 30 Oct 2008 14:07:54 PDT

The author argues that Thomas Hobbes anticipates a set of questions about meaning and semantic order that come to fuller expression in the 20th century, in the writings of W.V.O. Quine, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty. Despite their different points of departure, these 20th-century writers pose a number of profound questions about the conditions for the stability of meaning, and about the conditions that govern the use of the term "language" itself. Though the more recent debate benefits from a set of philosophical tools unavailable in the seventeenth century, the author further argues that Hobbes performs a number of maneuvers in his texts from which his 20th-century successors would profit.

Market Hegemony and Economic Theory

Ellis, S. — Thu, 30 Oct 2008 14:07:54 PDT

It is central to standard economic theory that people act on their interests. People are interested in a variety of things, so a range of values should influence market behavior. When engaged in commerce, however, people generally act for personal gain; the influence of other values usually just disappears in the marketplace. What is missing from the standard account is that people often act on proper subsets of their interests. Economics can, however, be extended to capture this insight.

Review Essay: Apprehending the "Social": Outhwaite, William, ed. (2006 [2003]). The Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought. 2nd edition. Advisory editor Alain Touraine. Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. Sica, Alan, edited and with introductions (2005). Social Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Present. Boston: Pearson Education

Sadovnikov, S. — Thu, 30 Oct 2008 14:07:54 PDT

The two books reviewed here are different efforts to embrace the vast subject called "social thought." The second edition of The Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought, edited by William Outhwaite with Alain Touraine, contains numerous updates; yet it also has some disadvantages compared to the first edition. Social Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Present, edited by Alan Sica, is a bold but controversial attempt at gathering in one anthology as many social thinkers as possible.

Book Review: Davis, John B., Alain Marciano, and Jochen Runde, eds. 2004. The Elgar Companion to Economics and Philosophy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar

Sassower, R. — Thu, 30 Oct 2008 14:07:54 PDT

Book Review: Bunge, Mario. 2006. Chasing Reality: Strife Over Realism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press

Richmond, S. — Thu, 30 Oct 2008 14:07:54 PDT

Book Review: Brannigan, A. (2004). The Rise and Fall of Social Psychology: The Use and Misuse of Experimental Method. New York: Aldine de Gruyter

Wettersten, J. — Thu, 30 Oct 2008 14:07:54 PDT

Book Review: Krieger, W. H. (2006). Can There Be a Philosophy of Archaeology? Lanham, MD: Lexington Books

Bell, J. A. — Thu, 30 Oct 2008 14:07:54 PDT